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I. Introduction 
Our earliest records of human existence provide evidence that 
people have always moved for environmental reasons.1  Moving 
away from areas at environmental risk, whether because of drought 
or sudden onset disasters, is a well-tested strategy people have used 
to survive and to protect themselves from harm.2  In the past few 
decades, evidence has mounted that the effects of anthropogenic 
climate change will make certain parts of the planet uninhabitable 
and that consequently large numbers of people will likely have to 
 
† Elizabeth Ferris is research professor at the Institute for the Study of International 
Migration, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 
 1 Amanda Mascarelli, Climate Swings Drove Early Humans out of Africa (and Back 
Again), SAPIENS (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.sapiens.org/evolution/early-human-
migration/ [https://perma.cc/53B2-68J2]. 
 2 Ed Chen, Climate Induced Migration and Conflict: Historical Evidence, and 
Likely Future Outlook, SCIENCE 2.0 (Sept. 21, 2009), 
https://www.science20.com/alchemist/blog/climate_induced_migration_and_conflict_his
torical_evidence_and_likely_future_outlook [https://perma.cc/GQ8A-BCDU]. 
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move.3 
The very first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change in 1990 predicted that one of the major consequences of 
climate change will be the large-scale movement of people.4  In 
particular climate scientists warn that a warming planet will mean 
more frequent and longer droughts which damage livelihoods and 
force large numbers of people to move in order to survive.5  More 
frequent and more intense sudden-onset disasters will displace 
people.6  Sea level rise and changing weather patterns are already 
leading to coastal and riverine erosion, ocean acidification, higher 
king tides, and saltwater intrusion into freshwater supplies.7   
Additionally, there is evidence that well-intentioned mitigation 
efforts to keep climate change in check by investing in renewable 
energies, protecting forests, and conserving habitats are causing 
further displacement—compelling people to leave their homes and 
livelihoods.8 
However, while there has long been a consensus that the effects 
of climate change will increase mobility,9 there is little conclusive 
evidence on when, how, who, where, or how many people will 
move.   Dire warnings of the potential for climate change to displace 
tens of millions or even hundreds of millions of people seem to have 
given way to the realization that the relationship between migration 
and climate change is a complex process influenced by factors that 
do not lend themselves well to estimates generated by statistical 
 
 3 OLI BROWN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION: OBSERVATIONS, 
PROJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (2007).  
 4 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE 
IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (J.T. Houghton et al. eds.,1990). 
 5 Chen, supra note 2. 
 6 Lisa Lim Ah Ken, Migration, Environment and Climate Change: What’s New, and 
What’s True, LANDSCAPE NEWS (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://news.globallandscapesforum.org/viewpoint/migration-environment-and-climate-
change-whats-new-and-whats-true/ [https://perma.cc/8GRZ-HGBZ]. 
 7 See Mcleod et al., A Blueprint for Blue Carbon: Toward an Improved 
Understanding of the role of Vegetated Coastal Habitats in Sequestering CO2, THE 
ECONOLOGICAL SOC’Y OF AM. (Jan. 20, 2011), 
https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1890/110004 
[https://perma.cc/5PLF-NSUS]. 
 8 See Sara Vigil, Displacement as a Consequence of Climate Change Mitigation 
Policies, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 43, 43–44 (2015). 
 9 BROWN, supra note 3. 
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projections and models.10 
There are serious difficulties in conceptualizing or coming up 
with a term to characterize those who move because of the effects 
of climate change.11  A particular challenge in assessing the 
likelihood that people will move because of climate change is the 
multi-causal nature of migration.  People move for a variety of 
reasons; for example, they move in search of livelihoods and better 
opportunities, because of conflict and persecution, and because they 
can no longer survive where they are.12  The 2011 Foresight Report 
looks at macro factors that lead people to move, including 
economic, environmental, demographic, political, and social 
factors, but also considers micro factors (such as gender, age, 
education, and wealth).13  In addition, there are intervening factors 
such as the existing legal framework, the cost of moving, and social 
networks at play; the intersection of all of these factors goes into an 
individual’s decision to move or to stay.14  For example, the same 
environmental pressures may lead a young healthy man to decide to 
move to another country while an elderly woman with disabilities 
may decide to remain where she lives.  After a storm destroys 
housing, one person with relatives in a nearby city may decide to 
move, whereas another person, facing similar destruction but not 
able to rely on social networks, may have no choice but to remain 
where she is.  A well-to-do homeowner in New Jersey may decide 
to move before repeated flooding destroys all of his assets while a 
poorer person living nearby may have no option but to remain in 
place.  Environmental factors always interact with other factors in 
decision-making about migration. 
 
 10 See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2006); RACHEL BAIRD, HUMAN TIDE: THE REAL MIGRATION CRISIS, A CHRISTIAN 
AID REPORT (2007); ROGER ZETTER, PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: 
DEVELOPING THE CAPACITY OF LEGAL AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS (2011); JANE 
MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); 
BROWN, supra note 3; Koko Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration: 
Governance Challenges, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 402 (2010); UK GOV’T OFF. FOR 
SCI., FORESIGHT: MIGRATION AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FUTURE 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2011). 
 11 See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Environment Refugees? Rethinking What’s in a Name, 
44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 461, 463 (2019) (discussing how climate change has a varied impact 
on migration and spans a broad array of migration choices). 
 12 See Ken, supra note 6. 
 13 UK GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., supra note 10, at 12. 
 14 See id. at 11. 
428 N.C. J. INT'L L.. [Vol. XLIV 
It is thus difficult to come up with accepted terminology for 
people who move in some measure because of environmental 
reasons, much less because of climate change.15  A second challenge 
is that the science is not yet sufficiently developed to determine the 
extent to which climate change is responsible for a particular 
sudden-onset event.16  While it is clear that climate change is 
changing patterns of sudden-onset disasters, leading to more intense 
and more frequent storms, we can still not yet say with any degree 
of certainty, for example, that Hurricane Harvey was caused by 
climate change.17  Thus, the terms “climate migrants,” “climate 
displaced,” or “climate refugees”18 are not straightforward.  This 
may become clearer with recent advances in attribution science, 
where scientists are beginning to use sophisticated models to 
attribute the likelihood that any one weather event is the result of 
human-induced climate change.19 
A third difficulty in terminology relates to our present 
international legal system for mobility which is based on sharp 
distinctions along two dimensions.  Those who cross an 
international border are treated differently than those who remain 
within their borders.20  Most of those moving because of the effects 
of climate change are expected to remain within the borders of their 
countries—and thus are either internal migrants or internally 
displaced persons.21  People who cross international borders are 
considered to be either international migrants or refugees,22 but 
neither category applies very well to those who move for 
 
 15 See Keyes, supra note 11, at 463–67. 
 16 See SARAH OPITZ STAPLETON, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND 
DISPLACEMENT: THE NEED FOR A RISK-INFORMED AND COHERENT APPROACH (2017). 
 17 See Matt McGrath, Hurricane Harvey: The Link to Climate Change, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-41082668 
[https://perma.cc/C54W-547E]. 
 18 See Tim McDonnell, The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To, NPR (June 
20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-
refugees-that-the-world-barely-pays-attention-to [https://perma.cc/KQ4X-J5NQ]. 
 19 See Sarah Kaplan & Angela Fritz, Climate Change Was Behind 15 Weather 
Disasters in 2017, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/12/10/climate-change-was-behind-
weather-disasters/?utm_term=.c04dfd4473ab [https://perma.cc/9H9K-2LKN]. 
 20 WORLD BANK GROUP, GROUNDSWELL: PREPARING FOR INTERNAL CLIMATE 
MIGRATION (Kanta Kumari Rigaud et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter GROUNDSWELL REPORT]. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
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environmental reasons.  Under international law, there is a clear 
legal distinction between those who are forced to move because of 
persecution and conflict (considered to be refugees) and those who 
choose to move voluntarily for a range of reasons (considered to be 
migrants).23 
The international refugee and migration regimes are very 
different animals.  But neither offers much to those who leave 
primarily because of environmental change, including climate 
change.  The definition of refugee as enshrined in the 1951 
Convention includes five grounds for a refugee claim: persecution 
on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a social 
group, and political opinion.24  More generally, refugees are 
considered to be those who cannot avail themselves of the 
protection of their governments.25  Courts have held persons seeking 
protection in another country because of the effects of climate 
change are not refugees under the U.N. Convention.26  Moreover, 
legal experts specialized in refugee law warn against efforts to 
broaden the category of refugees, fearing that such a move could 
weaken an already over-stretched system.27  International migration 
law is rooted in international human rights law,28 and indeed people 
do not lose their rights when they migrate, including those who 
migrate for mainly environmental reasons.  But beyond 
international human rights law, the existing normative frameworks 
in the migration regime focus mainly on migrant workers and do not 
specifically apply to those who leave their country because of the 
 
 23 Adrian Edwards, UNHCR viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘migrant’ – Which is right?, 
U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-
right.html [https://perma.cc/59S4-MMF6]. 
       24 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T 6223, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Gill Bonnett, Climate Change Refugee Cases Rejected, RADIO N.Z. (Oct. 24, 
2017), https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/342280/climate-change-refugee-cases-
rejected [https://perma.cc/BNF3-XJUM]. 
 27 See Jane McAdam, Seven Reasons the UN Refugee Convention Should Not Include 
‘Climate Refugees,’ SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June 6, 2017), 
https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/seven-reasons-the-un-refugee-convention-should-not-
include-climate-refugees-20170606-gwl8b4.html [https://perma.cc/CCE6-WKYQ]. 
 28 See MASSIMO FRIGO, MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
(Róisín Pillay eds., Priyamvada Yarnell trans., 2014). 
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effects of climate change.29 
For the first time, in 2010 the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’s meeting in Cancun referred to 
mobility as a form of adaptation to climate change and 
recommended that further work be done in the areas of migration 
(presumed to be voluntary), displacement (forced movement), and 
planned relocations (when a government resettles a community in 
order to protect them from the effects of climate change).30  There 
has been considerable research on the first two of these, including 
major institutional efforts by the European Union, the U.K.’s 
Foresight Study, the International Organization for Migration 
(“IOM”), and the Platform on Disaster Displacement.31   Less work 
has been done on planned relocations, perhaps for the 
understandable reason that this is considered as a last resort, and 
indeed, existing research indicates that such planned relocations are 
fraught with difficulties.32 
For these reasons, it has been difficult to reach common 
understanding—and even basic definitions—among those working 
in the area of climate change mobility.  There is no consensus on 
terminology or on how to deal with the multi-causal nature of 
movements.33  Nor are there widely-accepted estimates of the 
number of people likely to move.34  It has also been complicated by 
policy-makers and researchers who approach the issue from very 
 
 29 See International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Concerning Migration for 
Employment, Jan. 22, 1952, 120 U.N.T.S. 71; Migrant Workers (Supplementary 
Provisions) Convention, June 24, 1975, I.L.O No. 143 (entered into force Dec. 9, 1978). 
 30 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun Agreements: Outcome 
of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7 (Dec. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Cancun 
Agreements]. 
 31 See EACH-FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION SCENARIOS 
FINAL REPORT SUMMARY (2012); EACH-FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FORCED 
MIGRATION SCENARIOS D.3.4. SYNTHESIS REPORT (2009); UK GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., supra 
note 10; ENV’T MIGRATION PORTAL, https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/ 
[https://perma.cc/B3BB-2CDW]; PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, 
https://disasterdisplacement.org/ [perma.cc/A8NT-FRGH]. 
 32 For research and other materials on planned relocations, see Planned Relocations, 
INST. FOR THE STUDY OF INT’L MIGRATION, https://isim.georgetown.edu/Planned-
Relocations (last visited on Apr. 15, 2019). 
 33 See Ken, supra note 6. 
 34 Id. 
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different backgrounds, using different assumptions and 
methodologies.  For example, marine scientists, refugee lawyers, 
disaster management officials, security analysts, and environmental 
lawyers all approach the issue of climate change mobility 
differently.35  It is thus understandable, as discussed further below, 
that there has been more progress and more consensus among those 
focusing on disaster displacement, particularly sudden-onset 
disasters,36  than on climate-change mobility.  The Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre has been collecting data on the 
number of people displaced by sudden-onset disasters and has found 
that on average 24.3 million people per year are displaced by 
sudden-onset disasters.37 
Two other political factors complicate efforts to develop new 
international standards or agreements to respond to those who move 
because of the effects of climate change.  First, there is presently 
little international appetite for assuming new international 
obligations or developing new international law.38  The big 
international successes of the last few years—the Paris Agreement, 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, Agenda 2030 
for Sustainable Development and, most recently, the Global 
Compact for Migration—are all aspirational frameworks that 
depend on voluntary compliance rather than legal obligations.39  
Secondly, in spite of these U.N. “successes,” this is a difficult time 
for multilateralism and collective action on pressing global issues 
writ large.  The liberal rules-based order that has largely provided 
stability and prosperity since World War II is being eroded due to 
changes in U.S. leadership.40  U.S. policy appears to have moved 
 
 35 See id. (discussing lack of consensus across the scientific and legal fields). 
 36 See id. (stating that the International Organization for Migration only added a 
climate change migration division in 2015). 




 38 See Kristen E. Boon, Disaster Displacement: Gaps in International Norms, 
OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 15, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/15/disaster-displacement-
gaps-international-norms/ [https://perma.cc/ZLX9-HNPH]. 
 39 See Dana Nuccitelli, Climate Scientists Debate a Flaw in the Paris Agreement, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-
consensus-97-per-cent/2018/mar/28/climate-scientists-debate-a-flaw-in-the-paris-
climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/8FX4-QEH2]. 
 40 ROBERT KAGAN, THE JUNGLE GROWS BACK: AMERICA AND OUR IMPERILED WORLD 
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away from seeing strong multilateral institutions as essential for 
U.S. national interests toward a worldview emphasizing “America 
First.”41  Moreover, the present xenophobic, anti-immigrant 
climate42 makes it difficult to come up with any new global 
framework which would make it easier, not harder, for people to 
gain entry into other countries.  Indeed, it has even been difficult to 
mobilize support for accepting recognized refugees—witness the 
sharp decline in U.S. resettlement places, from 110,000 under 
President Obama to 40,000 under the Trump administration.43 
For these reasons, it is highly unlikely that the international 
community will develop and adopt a comprehensive legal 
framework in the near future for those who move because of the 
effects of climate change.  A number of such draft treaties and 
agreements exist, but they are likely to remain an issue for 
discussion among academics and lawyers rather than serving as a 
basis for political action.44 
This Article now considers alternative ways of using existing 
legal instruments to respond to those who are presently moving and 
who will move in the future because of the effects of climate change, 
beginning with people who move within the borders of their own 
countries.  This includes using the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement and supporting national-level efforts to deal with 
those moving because of climate change. 
II. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“the 
Principles or Guiding Principles”), developed in 1998 and affirmed 
by the World Summit of 2005, explicitly apply to those displaced 
by disasters as well as by conflict.45  The Principles were developed 
 
17 (2018). 
 41 See id. 
 42 See Derek Thompson, How Immigration Became So Controversial, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/why-immigration-
divides/552125/ [https://perma.cc/4LMY-2MBQ]. 
 43 Dara Lind, Trump Slashed Refugee Levels this Year.  For 2019, He’s Slashing 
Them Even Further, VOX (Sep. 18, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/9/17/17871874/refugee-news-record-history-asylum 
[https://perma.cc/D5K6-U66R]. 
 44 See Katrina Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 
167, 216 (2013). 
 45 U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. 
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to respond to gaps in existing international law and to provide 
appropriate guidance to national authorities in responding to those 
who are compelled to move elsewhere in their own countries.46  The 
Principles were developed by legal experts, convened by Francis 
Deng, then-Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally 
Displaced Persons (“IDPs”).47  The 30 principles were synthesized 
and compiled from existing hard law particularly applicable to 
IDPs.48  Thus, the Convention on the Rights of the Child affirms that 
all children have the right to education,49 and the Principles state 
that all internally displaced children have the right to education.50 
While not in itself a legally binding document, because the 
Guiding Principles are based on and draw out the relevant norms of 
international human rights and humanitarian law (and by analogy, 
refugee law),51 they have enjoyed broad support.52  Central to the 
Guiding Principles is the affirmation that states bear the primary 
responsibility for protection of people, both citizens and habitual 
residents within their area of jurisdiction.53  They recognize that 
individuals have a right to protection from arbitrary displacement as 
well as to assistance and protection when they are displaced.54  
Moreover, the Principles highlight the right to find durable 
solutions to displacement, return or settlement in the place of 
displacement, or in another part of the country.55 
The Guiding Principles are often considered to be one of the 
most effective soft law mechanisms.56  Now available in more than 
 
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Ad.2 (1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. at 7. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 50 Guiding Principles, supra note 45. 
 51 See id. at intro. (“Although they do not constitute a binding instrument, these 
Principles reflect and are consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law 
and analogous refugee law.”).  
 52 See Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles: How Do They Support IDP Response 
Strategies, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Nov. 9, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-
record/the-guiding-principles-how-do-they-support-idp-response-strategies/ 
[https://perma.cc/PB6Z-S2HF]. 
 53 Guiding Principles, supra note 45. 
 54 Id. at principles 3, 6. 
 55 Id. at principle 28. 
 56 Cohen, supra note 52. 
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60 languages, they have been used by many governments as the 
basis for the development of national laws and policies on IDPs and 
have been incorporated into policies and guidelines for 
humanitarian actors.57  They have been useful to governments 
responding to large-scale internal displacement in providing 
concrete guidance as to their responsibilities.58 
The Guiding Principles have been successful in providing a 
normative framework that has undoubtedly protected the rights of 
some IDPs in many situations.59  Presently some 40 governments 
have developed national laws and policies on IDPs—although not 
all of these are based on the Guiding Principles.60  Even when 
governments have developed laws, however, implementation has 
usually been lacking.  Phil Orchard has found that almost a third of 
these policies have not been implemented at all.61  With a few 
exceptions, even when governments have developed laws and 
policies on IDPs, the almost exclusive focus has been on those 
displaced by conflict, and there is as yet only one country that has 
incorporated them into a national policy on climate change 
displacement (Vanuatu, discussed further below).62  For example, 
Kenya has developed strong legislation to respond to conflict-
induced displacement, but has not applied these policies to those 
displaced by drought.63  Moreover, in recent years, there has been 
concern that the issue of internal displacement is falling off the 
international agenda. 64  For example, neither of the two Global 
Compacts adopted in 2018 (one on Refugees and the other on Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration) made more than a passing reference 
to internal displacement.65 
 
 57 PHIL ORCHARD, PROTECTING THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED: RHETORIC AND 
REALITY (2019). 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 ORCHARD, supra note 57. 
 62 See id. 
 63 Dulo Nyaro, Assessing the Evidence: Migration, Environment, and Climate 
Change in Kenya, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION 101–02 (2016), 
https://gmdac.iom.int/MECLEP-Assessment-Kenya [https://perma.cc/9QHL-BY4C]. 
 64 ELIZABETH FERRIS, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, TEN YEARS AFTER HUMANITARIAN 
REFORM: HOW HAVE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS FARED? 3 (2015), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/54cb8e484.html [https://perma.cc/3RQB-XDGT]. 
 65 See id. 
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One of the more concrete indicators of the success of the 
Guiding Principles has been the fact that they have directly led to 
the formulation of the world’s first binding regional instrument on 
internal displacement.66  The African Union Convention on 
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(the Kampala Convention) was adopted by the African Union in 
2009 and entered into force in 2012.67  This Convention built on the 
Great Lakes Protocols.68  The Kampala Convention is the first 
binding international treaty to acknowledge climate change as a 
driver of displacement.69  Unlike the Guiding Principles, the 
Convention is a formal, legally binding convention that establishes 
the obligations of states to prevent displacement, to protect and 
assist those who have been displaced, and to support solutions to 
displacement.70  The Convention spells out the obligation of states 
to prevent displacement by, among other actions, instituting early 
warning systems and developing disaster risk reduction strategies.71  
States parties are also required to protect and assist those displaced 
by disasters, including by climate change.72  Finally, states parties 
are liable to make reparations to IDPs for damages when “a State 
Party refrains from protecting and assisting internally displaced 
persons in the event of natural disasters.”73  The African Union and 
the states parties to the Convention are still working on 
implementation of the Convention and its domestication into 
appropriate legal frameworks at the national level.74  In spite of the 
 
 66 African Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), adopted on Oct. 23, 2009 49 I.L.M. 
86 [hereinafter Kampala Convention]. 
 67 Id. 
 68 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Protocol on the Protection 
and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Nov. 
30, 2006). 
 69 Allehone M. Abebe, The Kampala Convention & Environmentally Induced 
Displacement in Africa, IOM INTERSESSIONAL WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 




 70 Id. 
 71 Kampala Convention, supra note 67, at art. 4(2). 
 72 Id. at art. 5(4). 
 73 Id. at art. 12(3). 
 74 Abebe, supra note 69. 
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lack of progress on implementation, the Kampala Convention 
stands as an important model for other regional organizations which 
are likely to be confronted with the challenge of responding to those 
who move because of the effects of climate change.  This possibility 
is discussed more fully later in this Article. 
In sum, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have 
provided useful guidance for states and international organizations 
in the development of policies and programs to protect and assist 
people displaced within the borders of their countries.  They stand 
as the best legal guidance presently available for the vast majority 
of those likely to be displaced by the effects of climate change.75  
They have served as the normative framework for efforts by 
international networks to establish operational guidelines for 
responding to people displaced and otherwise affected by natural 
disasters initiatives,76 which are discussed later in this Article. 
As governments throughout the world are faced with the reality 
of large-scale displacement within the borders of their countries, 
they would be well-advised to consider incorporating the Guiding 
Principles into their national laws and policies.  Legal scholars 
could be encouraged to provide additional guidance as to how this 
framework could be interpreted into national law, particularly as it 
relates to climate change.  At the end of the day, most of those 
displaced by the effects of climate change, who will remain within 
the borders of their countries, will have to depend on national laws 
and programs for protection and assistance.  This applies to people 
displaced in wealthy countries, such as the United States, as well as 
those forced to leave their homes in small-island developing 
countries and in the world’s great mega-cities located in vulnerable 
coastal areas.  We turn now to the level of national laws and policies 
in consideration of normative guidance available to support those 
who move because of the effects of climate change. 
III. National-Level Policies 
Although there is a growing body of research on the ways in 
which climate change is leading both to greater migration and 
 
 75 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, IOM FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING INTERNAL 
DISPLACEMENT 2017 7 (2017), 
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/170829_IDP_Framework_Low
Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FS7-4U2L]. 
 76 Id. 
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displacement,77 there is a paucity of research on national policies on 
environmental migration and displacement beyond disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) measures aimed at increasing resilience (where 
there is a substantial literature).78  Those few studies that look at the 
policy dimension79 suggest the need to incorporate migration and 
displacement into national development or climate change 
adaptation and DRR plans, a point reaffirmed in the World Bank’s 
2018 flagship report, Groundswell.80 
Presently there is little information on whether migration is even 
included in national and local climate change and disaster risk 
reduction policies, and there is virtually no information on how 
policies related to environmental migration were made.81  Nor is 
there research on the impact of such policies to prevent or manage 
migration.82  The reasons for this lack of research seems to be the 
reluctance to consider migration as a response to the effects of 
climate change,83 and focuses instead on measures to mitigate the 
effects of climate change so that people are able to remain in place. 
In looking at national level laws and policies, it seems that much 
of the relevant work currently underway is taking place at the state 
and local levels, which are the governments most likely to be 
confronted with responding to environmental displacement— 
 
 77 BROOKINGS-LSE, PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (2014), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Climate-Change-and-Internal-Displacement-October-10-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SV2-KK5R]. 
 78 See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION (2009), 
http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/ddr_cca_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWD8-
S5YT]. 
 79 U.N. OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, DISASTER DISPLACEMENT: HOW TO 
REDUCE RISK, ADDRESS IMPACTS AND STRENGTHEN RESILIENCE (2018), available at 
https://www.unisdr.org/files/58821_disasterdisplacement05a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A6M7-W7QX]; Adelle Thomas & Lisa Benjamin, Policies and 
Mechanisms to Address Climate-Induced Migration and Displacement in Pacific and 
Caribbean Small Island Developing States, 10 INT’L J. OF CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES 
AND MGMT. 86 (2018). 
 80 GROUNDSWELL REPORT, supra note 20. 
 81 Id. at xxv. 
 82 Id. at 185. 
 83 See Katrina Wyman, Responses to Climate Change, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 167, 
172 (2013) (“It is also challenging to attribute a migration decision to climate change, as 
migration decisions are a response to a combination of factors.”). 
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sometimes with the support of national political institutions.84  Thus, 
in the United States, the state of Louisiana’s efforts to relocate the 
small community of Isle Jean Charles (which has lost 98% of its 
physical territory in recent years to erosion, subsidence, and storm 
surges) is being carried out with the support of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development.85 
In Florida, municipalities have developed different programs to 
respond to the threats posed by climate change.  One significant 
positive development is the establishment of the Southeast Florida 
Regional Climate Change Compact, the first case of U.S. local 
governments voluntarily coming together to adapt to climate change 
on a regional scale.86  In 2010, four southeast Florida counties 
created a compact to promote regional coordination of climate 
adaptation: Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach.87  
Since then, they have expanded the compact to include non-
governmental organizations and various governmental actors such 
as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.88  Working through the 
compact, the four countries have developed a Regional Climate 
Action Plan which includes 110 projects for resilience and 
adaptation.89 
One of the best examples of a national policy on displacement 
caused by climate change is Vanuatu’s recent National Policy on 
Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement.90  This policy 
 
 84 See Coral Davenport & Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American 
‘Climate Refugees,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2016, at A1 (referencing the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s $1 billion in grants to help communities adapt to 
climate change). 
 85 Id. 
 86 See David L. Markell, Emerging Legal and Institutional Responses to Sea-Level 
Rise in Florida and Beyond, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2016); SYDNEY MENEES & JESSICA 
GRANNIS, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, LESSONS IN REGIONAL RESILIENCE: THE 
SOUTHEAST FLORIDA REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT (2017), available at 
https://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/GCC-Lessons-in-Regional-Resilience-
SE_FL_Compact-Jan_2017-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5Q2-PWM7]. 
 87 SOUTHEAST FLORIDA REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT COUNTIES, A REGION 
RESPONDS TO A CHANGING CLIMATE: REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2012), 
http://www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/regional-
climate-action-plan-final-ada-compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB23-93G7]. 
 88 Id. at 48. 
 89 See id. at 13. 
 90 See GOV’T OF VANUATU, NATIONAL POLICY ON CLIMATE CHANGE & DISASTER-
INDUCED DISPLACEMENT (2018), 
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is based on the country’s own legal system (including respect for 
traditional law and customary land arrangements) and incorporates 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.91  It suggests 
concrete ways of preventing, responding to, and resolving 
displacement caused by climate change and disasters.92  It 
recognizes the multi-causal nature of displacement, and the 
importance of consulting with communities affected by 
displacement.93  The policy proposes “twelve strategic priority areas 
for action to ensure displacement and human mobility 
considerations are mainstreamed into Vanuatu’s planning at 
national, provincial and local levels.”94  The policy further identifies 
specific objectives, actions to be taken, and the relevant ministries 
and agencies charged with implementation and follow-up.95  
Vanuatu’s policy stands as a model for other countries experiencing 
or likely to experience displacement caused by disasters and the 
effects of climate change.  An interesting area for further research 
and for the expertise of international lawyers is to analyze the extent 
to which Vanuatu’s new policy can serve as a model for other 
governments likely to experience large-scale displacement caused, 
at least in part, by the effects of climate change. 
The experience of international disaster law, pioneered by the 
International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies 
(“IFRC”), suggests the importance of legal preparedness in 
preparing for disasters and indeed for the long-term effects of 
climate change.96  IFRC suggests that governments are advised to 
review their national policies on disaster management and ensure 




 91 See id. at 17. 
 92 See id. at 7. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. at 8. 
 95 See id. at 21 (listing various strategic areas and specifying the agencies to act). 
 96 See About the Disaster Law Programme, INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED 
CRESCENT SOC’YS (2019), http://www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/idrl/about-idrl/ 
[https://perma.cc/4RCH-9BQ5]. 
 97 See INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
GUIDELINES FOR THE DOMESTIC FACILITATION AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISASTER RELIEF AND INITIAL RECOVERY ASSISTANCE 16 (2011), 
http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/1205600-IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20(2).pdf 
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of international disaster law is on immediate response (for example, 
taking measures to ensure that in the event of an emergency, 
customs offices will be expected to have longer opening hours and 
that relief goods can receive expedited clearance),98 other factors 
should be taken into consideration.  The development of national 
laws which could apply to those displaced by disasters and climate 
change could include measures such as ensuring that displaced 
children will have access to education even if they do not have their 
school records or that the government will take action to ensure the 
protection of property and other assets left behind after people are 
displaced because of the effects of climate change. 
IV. Planned Relocations 
As noted above, in 2010 the Conference of Parties of the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), 
recognized that mobility may be an adaptation strategy for climate 
change and called for further work on displacement, migration and 
planned relocations.99  The Paris Agreement extended this 
recognition and called for concrete recommendations to be 
developed.100  While there has been considerable work on 
displacement and migration,101 much less is known about planned 
relocations.  Although the need for them is likely to increase in the 
coming years, there has been little guidance or statement of 
principles to address planned relocations as a protection strategy in 
response to the adverse effects of climate change.  Development 
induced displacement and resettlement have been extensively used 
in the case of development projects,102 but their applicability in other 
cases of climate change has received relatively little attention. 
Recognizing this gap, from 2011–2015, the Brookings 
Institution, Georgetown University, and United Nations High 
 
[https://perma.cc/JU2A-2SPZ]. 
 98 See id. at 20. 
 99 See Cancun Agreements, supra note 30. 
 100 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, ¶ 49 (Jan. 29, 2016). 
 101 See id. (requesting “expert bodies outside the Convention” and the Adaption 
Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to continue their work on 
displacement related to climate change). 
 102 See generally Chris de Wet, Improving Outcomes in Development-Induced 
Displacement and Resettlement Projects, 24 FORCED MIGRATION REV. (2002) (discussing 
Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement Projects generally). 
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Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) worked on planned 
relocations, organizing meetings of both legal experts and 
practitioners in Bellagio, San Remo and again in Bellagio in May 
2015.103  The 2015 meeting drafted Guidance on Protecting People 
through Planned Relocations from Disasters and Environmental 
Change, including Climate Change as a guide for governments and 
others when planned relocations are necessary to protect people 
because of disasters and environmental change, including the 
effects of climate change.104  This Guidance only applies to those 
who are relocated within the borders of their countries.  This is 
likely to be the vast majority of people although there is 
considerable interest in those communities that might have to be 
relocated, at some point, to other countries.105 
The Guidance was widely disseminated and also served as the 
basis for the development of a Toolbox which lays out a number of 
concrete ways to translate the principles into practice.106  The 
Toolbox organizes its checklists into five essential categories, 
including:  (1) establishing and complying with an appropriate legal 
framework; (2) understanding and addressing the needs and impacts 
of Planned Relocations on affected populations; (3)  providing 
information to, undertaking consultation with, and ensuring the 
participation of, affected populations; (4)  understanding and 
addressing complexities related to land issues; and (5) undertaking 
 
 103 See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ET AL., GUIDANCE ON PROTECTING PEOPLE 
FROM DISASTERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE THROUGH PLANNED RELOCATION (2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GUIDANCE_PLANNED-
RELOCATION_14-OCT-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY3Q-UJ5E]; DANIEL PETZ, 
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A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Brookings-Planned-Relocations-Annotated-Bibliography-June-
2015.pdf [ https://perma.cc/SX5F-JBRF]; THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ET AL., PLANNED 
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ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Brookings-Planned-Relocations-Framework-DPetz-June-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE65-PG5J]. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 PLANNED RELOCATIONS, DISASTER AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 103. 
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monitoring and evaluation, and ensuring accountability.107  The 
Toolbox further addresses the importance of making the decision 
that a community must be relocated, developing a comprehensive 
plan for the relocation and implementing the plan in a way that 
respects the rights of all of those affected by the relocation, 
including those who are relocated, the communities that receive 
them and those that are left behind.108 
This initiative thus provides a framework to support 
governments and affected communities considering relocation of 
entire communities.  Such relocations are generally considered as a 
last resort after other measures to enable communities to remain in 
place.109  While some communities are proactively asking the 
government for assistance in relocation,110 others, such as Del Mar, 
California are actively resisting calls to at least consider relocations 
as a form of adaptation to the effects of climate change in their 
communities.111 
Work in these three areas—the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement as a normative framework at the international level, 
laws and policies developed at the national level, and preparing for 
planned relocations,—offer guidance for those displaced internally 
because of the effects of climate change. 
We now turn to efforts to deal with international displacement 
and migration, beginning with international refugee law, which as 
noted above is not immediately relevant but where some related 
efforts offer interesting possibilities. 
V. Refugee Law 
As noted above, refugee law in its current form will only cover 
a very small group of people affected by climate change, those that 
 
 107 Id. at 4. 
 108 Id. at 6–7 (“Box 1.2. Basic Principles of Planned Relocations”). 
 109 Id. at 3. 
 110 See generally Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating 
an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. REV. 
OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (2017) (discussing the steps taken by Federal, State, and Tribal 
governments have taken to relocate Newtok, one of at least twelve small indigenous 
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 111 Nathan Rott, ‘Retreat’ Is Not an Option as a California Beach Town Plans for 
Rising Seas, NPR (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/04/672285546/retreat-is-
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suffer from ensuing conflict, persecution, or a breakdown of public 
order.112  It may be that climate change exacerbates conflict and that 
as a result people flee across national borders; if they are fleeing 
violence and persecution, they may be able to avail themselves of 
protection under refugee law.113  There also may be cases where 
people affected by disasters face discrimination on the basis of one 
of the five protected grounds in the 1951 Convention114 and as a 
consequence seek protection in other countries.  In these cases, 
people so displaced may be able to find protection under the refugee 
convention.115 
However, the Refugee Convention does not apply to those 
whose main reason for flight is a deteriorating environment or the 
effects of climate change.116  While some have suggested changing 
the 1951 Refugee Convention to apply to such individuals,117  States 
are suspicious of extending legal obligations to other categories of 
displaced persons.118  Negotiating a new protocol or amendment to 
the Refugee Convention is thus unlikely and were such negotiations 
to occur, could prove counterproductive. 
However, there are other areas where it may be possible to use 
refugee law.  Some regional instruments such as the 1969 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa119 and the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees120 have moved beyond the narrow 
definition of the Geneva Convention.  They acknowledge that 
 
 112 See Bonnett, supra note 26. 
 113 Caitlin Werrell & Francesco Femia, Climate Change Raises Conflict Concerns, 
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international protection may be needed for events that “seriously 
disturb public order” and thus potentially provide protection for 
people displaced by circumstances accompanying disasters.121  
More recently, the Brazil Plan of Action, adopted in December 2014 
by 28 countries, explicitly mentions climate change as a challenge 
to the region and calls on UNHCR to support the development of 
national and regional policies to respond to those forced to move 
because of climate change and disasters.122  There may be potential 
in applying these regional instruments and encouraging the 
development of similar instruments in other regions. 
The concept of complementary protection, i.e. regional and 
national norms for temporary or subsidiary protection, offers other 
possibilities.  This concept was developed to fill some protection 
needs outside the 1951 Refugee Convention.123  An EU directive, 
for instance, allows the establishment of temporary protection for 
people facing generalized violations of human rights in their home 
countries, although it has never been applied.124  Subsidiary 
protection can be claimed in the EU when applicants face the risk 
of serious harm such as indiscriminate violence in their home 
countries.125  While neither of these measures explicitly references 
 
 121 Regional instruments such as the 1969 OAU Convention and the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration apply a wider definition of refugees that includes events which seriously 
disturb public order, thus potentially encompassing disasters.  This was used by some 
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THE PROTECTION OF CROSS-BORDER DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS 
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giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons 
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 125 See Directive 2001/95, 2001 O.J. (EU) (directing standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for 
a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
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climate-related risks, it may be that more intense disasters or 
prolonged drought may increase the likelihood of generalized 
human rights violations and indiscriminate violence and thus make 
the regimes applicable. 
However, as McAdam argues, the concept of complementary 
protection would “need to be substantially developed” before it 
could become more generally applicable to climate change-related 
displacement.126  Even if such measures were applied to those 
leaving their countries for climate change-related reasons, they 
usually provide only temporary protection and as the norms often 
reflect the lowest common denominator, they tend to establish weak 
protection standards.127  Although far from perfect, a further area for 
legal experts would be to examine the extent to which such 
measures could bridge some of the existing gaps in the context of 
climate change-related displacement. 
VI. International Law Commission Draft Articles on the 
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters 
Another international initiative which may provide the basis for 
a new normative framework is the work of the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”), a U.N. body called upon by states to further 
the development of international law which has sought to establish 
hard law to protect people displaced by disasters.128  After the failure 
of several efforts in the 1980s to develop a binding legal framework 
regulating humanitarian assistance for disasters outside armed 
conflicts, the 1990s brought new attention to the topic,129 leading to 
the elaboration of “Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the 
Event of Disasters.”130  The ILC worked on the draft from 2007 until 
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 127 See id. at 18–36 (noting the jurisprudence still requires significant development 
before it will be fully applicable to climate-related displacements). 
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2016 when it presented its draft articles and asked for comments by 
states.131  In November 2018 the General Assembly “took note” of 
the work of the ILC and in particular the comments received from 
six states and agreed to schedule another discussion in 2020.132 
The present 21 Draft Articles aim to frame an effective response 
to disasters, detailing both the rights and obligations of affected 
states and other international actors and define “disaster” as “a 
calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of 
life, great human suffering and distress, displacement, or large-scale 
material, economic or environmental damage, thereby seriously 
disrupting the functioning of society.”133  With this broad definition 
covering both human-made and environmental disasters, the 
Articles would not only be of relevance primarily for internal 
displacement but also for the actions of international actors to 
respond to such cases.  That said, it is not entirely clear whether the 
Draft Articles would also apply to slow-onset disasters and 
comments, including by the IOM and the IFRC who argue that the 
Draft Articles need further work.134 
According to the Draft Articles, the affected state remains the 
ultimate gatekeeper, although it shall not “withhold or withdraw 
arbitrarily” consent to external assistance (Art. 14 II).135  The 
considerable amount of time and resources devoted to these 
negotiations reflect the general caution of states concerning the 
assumption of new obligations for climate-change related 
displacement that may infringe on their sovereignty.136  At this 
 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/6_3.shtml#srapprep [https://perma.cc/3WKW-G7XN] 
 131 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the 
Event of Disasters, Ch. IV, ¶E, U.N. Doc. A/71/10 (Aug. 12, 2016). 
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point, it is difficult to tell if the Draft Articles will ever be included 
in a new binding legal treaty submitted to states for their signature 
and ratification.137  Several major states have deemed the existing 
legal framework to be sufficient and see more practical value in 
non-binding guidelines or in a framework of principles and 
recommendations.138  It thus remains to be seen in which format the 
Draft Articles will be finalized, and how they may shape 
international law for those displaced by the effects of climate 
change. 
VII. Mini-Multilateral Initiatives: The Nansen Initiative and 
the Platform for Disaster Displacement 
Following the call of the 2010 UNFCCC Cancún Agreement to 
increase cooperation and coordination regarding climate change-
related mobility, a number of governments and organizations 
mounted efforts to increase the visibility of climate change-induced 
displacement.139  One of these initiatives, the Nansen Conference in 
June 2011, led to the development of the Nansen Principles,140  
which among other things, called for a sounder knowledge base.  It 
also described the responsibilities of a broad range of stakeholders, 
and highlighted the need for better preventive capacities and more 
resilience.141 
In particular, one of the principles identified an important 
protection gap associated with cross-border mobility in the context 
of disasters.142  As a concrete follow-up, the governments of Norway 
and Switzerland launched a new effort at the UNHCR Ministerial 
Conference in late 2012, known as the Nansen Initiative.143  This 
effort was intended to be a state-owned, yet bottom-up and 
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participatory consultation process rather than an initiative solely 
carried out by legal experts.144  It sought to build a better 
understanding of cross-border displacement resulting from disasters 
in the context of climate change and to develop a consensus around 
applicable protection mechanisms.145  The term “in the context of 
climate change” was used to get around to the difficulties of 
ascribing causality for displacement to climate change alone.146 
The Nansen initiative, under the leadership of its Special Envoy, 
Walter Kälin and the support of a small secretariat,147 organized 
various regional and sub-regional discussions in disaster hotspot 
areas, bringing together representatives of countries of origin and 
destination, civil society, and international organizations over the 
course of 2013–2015.148  The results from these regional 
consultations as well as from additional research commissioned by 
the Nansen Initiative were synthesized at a global 
intergovernmental consultation in 2015.149 
The research and consultative processes produced a rich 
collection of conceptual frameworks and good practices to be used 
by governments and others and served as the background for the 
development of the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border 
Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate 
Change,150 which both establishes standards for the treatment of 
affected people and for effective operational responses.  Endorsed 
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by 109 government delegations in October 2015,151 the Agenda 
addresses questions of admission and stay for cross-border disaster 
displacement.152 
Undoubtedly, the Nansen Initiative catalyzed government 
attention and action around cross-border mobility in the context of 
climate change.  In May 2016, under the leadership of the 
governments of Germany and Bangladesh, the Platform on Disaster 
Displacement was established to follow up the work of the Nansen 
Initiative and to implement the recommendations in the Agenda for 
Protection.153 
VIII. The International Climate Change Regime 
Another possible source for development of legal norms on 
climate change-induced mobility is the UNFCCC, which is the 
major legal framework for international climate action.154  However, 
UNFCCC was relatively late in considering how to deal with 
migration and displacement stemming from the effects of climate 
change.155  Only concerted advocacy before the sixteenth 
Conference of the Parties (“COP”) in Cancún brought human 
mobility more significantly into the UNFCCC negotiations.156  
Thanks to these efforts, states adopted the Cancún Adaptation 
Framework in late 2010, which recognized human mobility as a 
form of adaptation to climate change.157  This decision led to an 
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increase in research by the academic community, spurred the efforts 
of the Nansen Initiative and others, and elevated the issue of 
mobility within the international climate change regime.158  In 
addition, an Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human 
Mobility was established to provide technical assistance to the 
Parties.159  Cancún thereby created important momentum and 
legitimacy for the issue160 and potentially opened access to 
international climate financing for mobility-related adaptation 
measures. 
Since the COP meeting in Cancún, migration, displacement, and 
relocation figured more visibly in the climate change 
negotiations.161  The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage (“WIM”) associated with climate change was established 
at the 19th meeting of the Conference of Parties and seeks, among 
other things, to improve the knowledge base on the relationship 
between climate change and migration, enhance cooperation among 
states, and to provide technical support on approaches to address 
loss and damage.162  The Advisory Group on Climate Change and 
Human Mobility established in Cancún continues its support to the 
associated WIM Executive Committee,163 and there is growing 
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recognition by states that human mobility constitutes an adaptation 
as well as a loss and damage issue.164 
In 2015 the Paris Agreement was adopted, in which virtually all 
states agreed for the first time on partially binding165 Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (“INDCs”) to limit climate 
change and its adverse impacts.166  A review of the INDCs submitted 
indicate that about one-fifth mention human mobility, mostly by 
those countries expected to be most affected by climate change.167  
These references mainly focus on migration as adaptation, security 
issues, and remittances as a contribution to climate action.168  
Importantly, a Task Force on Displacement was created under the 
Warsaw Mechanism to “develop recommendations for integrated 
approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to 
the adverse impacts of climate change.”169 
This Task Force on Displacement brings together 13 
representatives of international organizations working on the issue, 
such as IOM, International Labor Organization (“ILO”), U.N. 
Development Program (“UNDP”), and the UNHCR, as well as the 
Platform on Disaster Displacement, civil society organizations, and 
representatives of UNFCCC bodies.170  The Task Force has 
developed a plan of action and produced a number of studies and in 
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2018 its mandate was extended.171 
While it is important that the issue of climate change-related 
mobility is dealt with in the framework of the UNFCCC, 
particularly as this is likely to be one of the main consequences of 
climate change,172 situating the issue in the context of “loss and 
damage” raises politically contentious questions, particularly in 
considering liability and compensation.173  There is a reluctance 
among some countries, particularly those who have been 
historically significant carbon emitters, to discuss liability for their 
actions in the context of displacement.174  Thus, while some have 
called the inclusion of migration in the preamble of the Paris 
agreement an “unprecedented breakthrough,”175  others have argued 
that the UNFCC is not the adequate forum to deal with 
displacement, particularly as the Framework faces difficulties in 
moving forward on less sensitive core functions.176 
On the other hand, others argue in favor of the potential of the 
UNFCCC to “prevent and mitigate displacement in the context of 
climate change[.]”177  In particular, the establishment of the WIM 
could lead to discussion on vital funding questions.178  This is an 
issue of great importance to countries which could face the need to 
relocate communities away from areas damaged by the effects of 
climate change.179  Whether or not the UNFCCC mechanisms, 
including the Task Force on Displacement, are able to come up with 
either new normative standards or concrete mechanisms to support 
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governments dealing with increased migration, displacement, and 
relocations stemming from climate change, it is indeed a positive 
step that the climate change community is discussing issues related 
to mobility. 
IX. Building on Operational Guidance 
Yet another approach to developing normative frameworks for 
those displaced or otherwise affected by disasters is to build on the 
framework and guidelines developed by international organizations 
to guide operational response.  In particular, the Operational 
Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural 
Disasters180 provide a rights-based approach to protecting those 
affected by disasters.181  This effort has its origins in the visit to Asia 
following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami by the Representative of 
the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons (“RSG”) who was concerned by the many human rights 
violations he witnessed in the operational response to the disaster.182  
In spite of the fact that unprecedented sums of money were raised 
for the victims of the tsunami and hundreds of actors mobilized to 
support the response, there was evidence of discrimination in 
assistance, inadequate attention to gender, and a lack of protection 
for many vulnerable groups.183  He called for the development of 
general guidance on human rights in humanitarian settings, 
applicable to IDPs but also to others who were not displaced but 
who also faced protection concerns.184  In 2006, he presented draft 
guidelines to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (“IASC”) on 
the Protection of Persons in Natural Disasters, which after field-
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testing, were revised and adopted by the IASC in 2010.185 
The Operational Guidelines, the first guidance of its kind for 
disaster settings, called for the incorporation of a human rights 
approach to both disaster risk reduction and to recovery efforts.186  
They emphasize that persons affected by natural disasters should 
enjoy the same rights and freedoms under human rights law as 
others in their country and not be discriminated against.187  The 
Guidelines also reconfirm the central principle of the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement that national authorities have 
the primary duty and responsibility to provide assistance to those 
affected by natural disasters and to protect their human rights.188  
The Operational Guidelines recognize that in the heat of an 
emergency, it is important to prioritize the implementation of rights.  
This means that in the initial days and weeks of emergency 
response, some rights, such as the right to food, water, and medical 
care take priority over other rights, such as the right to vote and to 
freedom of movement.189 
Like the Guiding Principles and other normative frameworks 
surveyed in this Article, the Operational Guidelines have served to 
raise awareness of the importance of a human rights approach in 
disaster response.190  They are directed primarily to operational 
agencies, including governmental disaster management agencies, 
international organizations, and non-governmental organizations 
involved in disaster response.191  They have also been used to 
provide human rights guidance for disaster risk reduction and thus 
can be a useful resources in the development of climate change 
adaptation policies.192  Similarly, individual operational agencies, 
such as the International Organization for Migration and the 
International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies, as 
well as the inter-agency cluster system have all developed policies 
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or guidelines which incorporate rights-based approaches.193  In 
particular, considerable work has been done to develop guidelines 
to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence in 
disaster settings.194  These kinds of operational guidelines do not 
constitute international law,195 but they can serve as both catalysts 
and building blocks for the development of laws and policies on 
climate change mobility.  They identify specific needs—such as the 
need to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and to reunite 
unaccompanied children with their families.196  These are needs that 
should be upheld in any normative frameworks on climate change-
induced mobility.197  They underscore the relevance of international 
human rights law at different stages of displacement.  Because they 
are based on concrete experiences by operational humanitarian 
actors,198 they indicate relevant areas which should be addressed in 
over-arching normative frameworks. 
X. Promising Areas for Further Work 
This Article has identified a number of efforts to develop 
normative frameworks for the treatment of those who leave their 
communities because of the effects of climate change.  While it is 
unlikely that the international community will adopt a legally-
binding comprehensive international convention on such 
movements, at least in the foreseeable future, the evidence suggests 
that considerable work is underway.  As it is likely that most 
population movements resulting from climate change will occur 
within state borders,199 it is important that further work be done to 
 
 193 See INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, OPERATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR INVOLVEMENT IN MIGRANT HEALTH AND CARE SERVICES 1, 5 (2016), 
https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/12/Operational-Health-
Framework-on-Migration.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQM9-ZP98]. 
 194 See IASC, Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in 
Humanitarian Action (2015), https://gbvguidelines.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/2015-IASC-Gender-based-Violence-Guidelines_lo-res.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PKJ-JGHD]. 
 195 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 5 (2019). 
 196 INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., GUIDELINES FOR INTEGRATING GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE INTERVENTIONS IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION: REDUCING RISK, PROMOTING 
RESILIENCE, AND AIDING RECOVERY 5 (2015). 
      197 Id. 
 198 See generally IASC, supra note 194 (providing data and concrete experiences that 
underscore the guidelines’ recommendations). 
 199 See GROUNDSWELL REPORT, supra note 20.  
456 N.C. J. INT'L L.. [Vol. XLIV 
incorporate the existing standards, primarily the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement, into national laws and policies applicable 
to those who move because of climate change.  More governments 
at the national, state, and local levels should be encouraged to 
review their existing laws and policies to either modify them or to 
adopt new laws and policies to meet the challenges of responding to 
larger movements of people resulting from climate change.  In 
particular, migration should be incorporated into national 
development plans, climate change adaptation plans, and disaster 
risk reduction policies.  While a few governments have made such 
efforts,200 the vast majority of governments of both developed and 
developing countries have not yet put into place plans to respond to 
increased migration resulting from climate change.201  There is a 
tremendous amount of work to be done in this area and outside legal 
experts have a key role to play in identifying issues and suggesting 
new legal approaches.  The Grantham Research Institute on Climate 
Change and the Environment and Sabin Center for Climate Change 
Law have a database of national laws and policies relating to climate 
change which provides a useful source for reviewing related 
national laws and policies and identifying countries where such 
policies are lacking.202  Even without a comprehensive international 
agreement, governments at all levels and countries can begin to 
develop national laws which will make a difference in the lives of 
those who have to move because of climate change.  And the 
development of a body of national legislation could be an important 
catalyst leading to the development of more international 
agreements. 
Given an international agreement is unlikely, a second 
promising area for normative development is at the regional level.  
The Kampala Convention is presently the only binding regional 
agreement which obligates states to prevent, respond to, and resolve 
internal displacement stemming from climate change.203  Although 
implementation of the Convention has been lacking,204 this is a case 
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where advice of legal experts could be helpful.  For example, 
analysis of how a particular African government could incorporate 
the provisions of the Kampala Convention into national law or 
suggestions of a monitoring mechanism to measure compliance 
with the Convention could contribute to strengthening normative 
frameworks generally.  In the Pacific Islands, strong regional 
organizations could take the lead in developing policies on climate 
change-related migration in the region.205  There are many regional 
processes, including the regional consultative processes on 
migration, usually led by IOM which could provide the forum for 
discussion of possible regional normative frameworks for dealing 
with environmental migration and development.206  For example, 
under the auspices of the Platform for Disaster Displacement, work 
has begun on a new non-binding regional agreement on cross-
border disaster displacement in South America.207  These offer 
promising opportunities for the development of both binding law at 
the regional level and for non-binding frameworks and agreements 
which could eventually lead to the development of new law. 
At the global level, while it is unlikely that a comprehensive 
legal instrument on climate change induced mobility will be 
adopted, there are processes underway, such as the Platform on 
Disaster Development, the International Law Commission, and the 
UNFCCC processes on displacement, which are slowly but steadily 
building up a body of norms and principles which could serve as the 
basis for a new legal convention on treatment of climate change 
migrants when the time is more auspicious.208  Some of these 
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initiatives, such as the Platform for Disaster Displacement and the 
Migrants in Countries in Crisis (“MICIC”)209 provide guidance for 
specific groups of people, namely cross-border disaster displaced 
and migrants caught up in crises in other countries, including natural 
disasters.210  MICIC, like the Platform on Disaster Displacement, is 
a state-led initiative which developed comprehensive guidelines and 
training materials for governments to prepare for such situations.211  
Although these “mini-multilateral initiatives” (so-called because 
rather than bringing in all 193 U.N. member states212 they have been 
developed by those countries with a particular interest in an issue) 
are not comprehensive, they do offer useful guidance in particular 
situations.213  These less-than-comprehensive approaches actually 
represent a creative and realistic response to the fact that many 
different types of people are likely to move because of the effects 
of climate change.  As noted earlier, an individual displaced by a 
hurricane in the United States is likely to have very different needs 
than a Somali pastoralist whose seasonal migrations are affected by 
climate change, or a Nigerian migrant caught up in a monsoon in 
Bangladesh. 
Finally, there is a golden opportunity in the December 2018 
adoption of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration.214  The Compact, also a non-binding agreement,215 makes 
specific commitments to address the drivers of environmental 
mobility and to develop policies to uphold the rights of those 
affected by these movements.216  It also offers an entry point for 
finding solutions for those who might not be able to move—the so-
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called “trapped populations”—and for using other migration 
pathways for safe and orderly migration as a way to reduce the risk 
of disasters and adapt to the slow-onset disasters.217  The Global 
Compact represents, for the first time, an international consensus on 
developing new ways of addressing the urgent needs of those 
displaced by environmental or climate change.218  The fact that the 
Global Compact for Migration includes these provisions is due to 
the hard work of civil society organizations as well as to the interests 
of states at risk from the effects of climate change.219  Among its 
provisions for follow-up and implementation, the Compact includes 
a new capacity development mechanism which could be used to 
provide technical support to governments, and to develop new laws 
and policies to deal with climate change-induced mobility.  It is too 
early to tell if the Global Compact for Migration will live up to its 
ambitious affirmations and objectives, but it is clear that it offers yet 
another “hook” for legal experts and others concerned with climate 
change as a driver of migration to develop new approaches and 
standards.220 
Given the reality of human-induced climate change and the 
certainty that even more people will leave their communities 
because of its effects,221 further work is needed to create adequate 
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